Face recognition: a model specific ability by Wilmer, Jeremy B. et al.
 
Face recognition: a model specific ability
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Wilmer, Jeremy B., Laura T. Germine, and Ken Nakayama.
2014. “Face recognition: a model specific ability.” Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience 8 (1): 769.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00769.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00769.
Published Version doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00769
Accessed February 17, 2015 2:23:15 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13347396
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAHUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
MINI REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 10 October 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00769
Face recognition: a model speciﬁc ability
Jeremy B. Wilmer
1*, Laura T. Germine
2 and Ken Nakayama
3
1 Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, USA
2 Psychiatric & Neurodevelopmental Genetics Unit, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA
3 Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
Edited by:
Mark A. Williams, Macquarie
University, Australia
Reviewed by:
Fiona N. Newell, Trinity College
Dublin, Ireland
Roberta Daini, Università degli studi
di Milano - Bicocca, Italy
*Correspondence:
Jeremy B. Wilmer, Department of
Psychology, Wellesley College, 106
Central Street, Wellesley, MA
02481, USA
e-mail: jwilmer@wellesley.edu
In our everyday lives, we view it as a matter of course that different people are good at
different things. It can be surprising, in this context, to learn that most of what is known
about cognitive ability variation across individuals concerns the broadest of all cognitive
abilities; an ability referred to as general intelligence, general mental ability, or just g. In
contrast, our knowledge of speciﬁc abilities, those that correlate little with g, is severely
constrained. Here, we draw upon our experience investigating an exceptionally speciﬁc
ability, face recognition, to make the case that many speciﬁc abilities could easily have
been missed. In making this case, we derive key insights from earlier false starts in
the measurement of face recognition’s variation across individuals, and we highlight the
convergence of factors that enabled the recent discovery that this variation is speciﬁc. We
propose that the case of face recognition ability illustrates a set of tools and perspectives
that could accelerate fruitful work on speciﬁc cognitive abilities. By revealing relatively
independent dimensions of human ability, such work would enhance our capacity to
understand the uniqueness of individual minds.
Keywords: speciﬁc ability, individual differences, face recognition, intelligence, IQ, multiple intelligences,
cambridge face memory test, generalist gene
INTRODUCTION
Most of what we know about human cognitive ability—and by
ability, we mean variation across individuals in performance or
potential—concerns g. g is the single, broad ability that has
been observed to account for a large portion of the variation
in any sufﬁciently large and diverse battery of cognitive tests
(Spearman, 1904; Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998). Studies of g (and
of highly g-related tests) have long dominated the human abil-
ities literature, producing the bulk of known genetic (Plomin
et al., 2013), neural (Deary et al., 2010), clinical (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), academic (Neisser et al., 1996),
professional (Schmidt and Hunter, 2004), and personal (Jensen,
1998; Deary, 2012) correlates of human abilities. In contrast
to the literature on g, the parallel literature on speciﬁc abili-
ties, those abilities that correlate little with g, is tiny (Neisser
et al., 1996; Jensen, 1998; Schmidt and Hunter, 2004; Deary,
2012).
Why do we know so little about speciﬁc abilities? Lack of inter-
est cannot account for this limited knowledge. Theories hypothe-
sizing consequential speciﬁc ability dimensions have enjoyed wild
popularity in ﬁelds as diverse as education and business, as well as
in the media (Goleman, 1995; Gardner, 2006). Another possible
explanation for the lack of knowledge about speciﬁc abilities is
that they simply do not play a very important role in our lives
(Schmidt and Hunter, 2004). Indeed, upon cursory examination,
the sheer size and apparent comprehensiveness of the human
abilities literature make it difﬁcult to imagine that important
speciﬁc abilities could have been missed.
We will argue here, nevertheless, that it is too early to write off
speciﬁc abilities as unimportant or inconsequential. We propose,
on the contrary, that the lack of emphasis on speciﬁc abilities is
an artifact of (a) traditional test development procedures in the
human abilities literature and (b) the bottleneck of human sub-
jects testing; and we suggest that recent methodological advances
and discoveries could be harnessed to fundamentally rebalance
our broad understanding of human talent toward a greater appre-
ciation of speciﬁc abilities. We will base this argument on insights
we have gained from researching face recognition ability. Work in
our labs and others has recently established face recognition as an
exceptionally speciﬁc ability (Wilmer et al., 2010, 2012; Wilhelm
et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2011; Hildebrandt et al., 2011; Peterson
and Miller, 2012; McGugin et al., 2012; Palermo et al., 2013).
To be clear, when we use the terms speciﬁc, speciﬁc ability,
speciﬁcity, or speciﬁcally in this paper, we use them in their
classic human variation sense to refer to performance that corre-
lates little across individuals with general intelligence (Spearman,
1904; Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998). The term speciﬁc is frequently
used differently in the experimental psychology and human
neuroscience literatures. In these literatures, it refers neither
to individual differences nor to general intelligence, but it is
rather used as a shorthand for domain or process speciﬁcity
(Gazzaniga,2004).Whilestudiesofindividualdifferencescanand
do effectively tackle questions of domain and process speciﬁcity
(Wilmer, 2008), here we focus on the more basic question of
whether an ability dissociates from (is speciﬁc relative to) general
intelligence.
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In the ﬁrst section below, we brieﬂy review the evidence
that face recognition varies speciﬁcally across individuals. In
the second section, we examine two illuminating false starts
whereby well-resourced efforts to measure face recognition abil-
ity misinterpreted promising evidence for its speciﬁcity. These
false starts demonstrate how easily a speciﬁc ability can be
overlooked. In the third and ﬁnal section, we identify three
key factors that fueled the recent discovery that face recogni-
tion ability is speciﬁc and that, we believe, could likewise fuel
the discovery of further speciﬁc abilities. These factors were:
incorporation of priorities, discoveries, and techniques from
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience; the devel-
opment and validation of an excellent test; and a powerful
internet-enabledCitizenScienceapproachtoinvestigatinghuman
variation.
FACE RECOGNITION VARIES SPECIFICALLY ACROSS
INDIVIDUALS
The core evidence that face recognition varies speciﬁcally across
individuals comes from two complementary sources. The ﬁrst
source is face recognition’s dissociations from other, more gen-
eral cognitive abilities; the second, equally-critical source is the
robust associations observed among assessments that measure
face recognition ability in very different ways.
Face recognition, as measured by the widely-used Cambridge
Face Memory Test (CFMT; Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006),
dissociates strongly from more general abilities. It dissociates
almost completely from standardized IQ tests. To date, its mean
reported correlation with such IQ tests, weighted by sample size
and corrected for range restriction in the IQ tests, is 0.01 (Davis
et al., 2011; Peterson and Miller, 2012; Palermo et al., 2013).
Face recognition, as measured by the CFMT, also dissociates
surprisingly strongly from other recognition abilities. It shares
a mere 3% of its variation with the recognition of word pairs
(n = 3003; 95% CIs 2–4%; Wilmer et al., 2010, 2012); and even
within the realm of visual recognition, it shares only 7% of its
variation with the recognition of abstract art images (n = 4475;
95% CIs 5–8%; Wilmer et al., 2010, 2012).
These pervasive dissociations from other abilities are not a
result of poor measurement. Not only is the CFMT as reliable
per unit time as the most widely-used IQ test (Wechsler, 2008;
Wilmer et al., 2010), but it correlates well with tests that measure
face identity processing in quite different ways. Two such tests
are the Cambridge Face Perception Test (CFPT), which corre-
lates 0.60 with the CFMT (n = 124; Bowles et al., 2009), and
the Cambridge Famous Faces Memory Test (CFFMT), which
correlates 0.52 with the CFMT (n = 1219; Wilmer et al., 2010,
2012).
The CFPT and CFFMT differ from the CFMT in multiple
ways. The CFMT assesses one’s ability to memorize a set of
previously unfamiliar faces and then, shortly thereafter, recognize
them among distractors. The CFPT, in contrast, assesses one’s
ability to rank several faces by the similarity of their identity to
a simultaneously-viewed “exemplar” face. The CFFMT, in further
contrast, assesses one’s ability to attach names or other identify-
ing information to celebrity faces learned haphazardly over one’s
lifetime.
The CFMT, CFPT, and CFFMT thus differ starkly in both the
taskbeingperformed(fromvisualmatchingintheCFPTtorecog-
nition in the CFMT to recall in the CFFMT) and the duration
over which faces must be remembered (from milliseconds in the
CFPTtominutesintheCFMTtoyearsordecadesintheCFFMT),
making their robust intercorrelations a powerful demonstration
of valid measurement.
Finally, and perhaps most impressive of all, the CFMT cor-
relates 0.37 with a person’s self-rating with the single statement
“I can recognize famous celebrities in photos or on TV” (n =
190; 95% CI 0.24–0.49; Wilmer et al., 2010). This is substantially
larger than the average 0.15 correlation found between objective
and self-report measures of memory abilities in a major meta-
analysis of 24,897 individuals tested across 169 studies (Beaudoin
and Desrichard, 2011).
Associations like these between CFMT and CFPT, CFFMT,
and self-reported recognition ability critically distinguish speci-
ﬁcity from invalid measurement. As we will see below, such
associations, as a counterpoint to face recognition’s persistent
dissociations, were the missing piece in prior face recognition
ability research.
In addition to being speciﬁc, human variation in face recogni-
tion is highly heritable (Wilmer et al., 2010). This combination of
speciﬁcity and heritability is rare (Wilmer et al., 2010). Indeed, so
consistently has speciﬁcity traded off against heritability in past
research that a recent behavioral genetic theory, the “generalist
gene” theory, posited that most or all cognitive variation results
from the same set of genes (Kovas and Plomin, 2006). A major
exception to the generalist gene theory (Wilmer et al., 2010;
Plomin et al., 2013), face recognition’s heritability demonstrates
that different sets of genes contribute independently to human
cognitive ability. Given the example of face recognition, it is
worthconsideringnotonlyhowmanyotherspeciﬁcabilitiesexist,
but also whether any of them are as strongly heritable as face
recognition.
In sum, face recognition, at least when measured via the
CFMT, is exceptionally speciﬁc. Moreover, it is rare among spe-
ciﬁc abilities for its high heritability. In the next section, by
examining two earlier false starts in the valid measurement of face
recognition ability, we illustrate barriers to the discovery of its
speciﬁcity that could bear importantly on the search for further
speciﬁc abilities.
TWO FALSE STARTS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF FACE
RECOGNITION ABILITY
In this section, we will recount two major efforts to assess
face recognition ability. These efforts, begun nearly 70 years
apart, are among history’s most concerted efforts to measure
any social ability (Kihlstrom and Cantor, 2000; Wilmer et al.,
2012). In each case, initial promising evidence for face recog-
nition’s speciﬁcity was misinterpreted as invalid measurement,
and development of the test in question was abandoned. These
missed opportunities to examine the speciﬁc ability of face recog-
nition seem unlikely to us to be isolated examples. The lessons
learned from these missed opportunities may therefore provide
valuable information on where to search for additional speciﬁc
abilities.
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The ﬁrst false start in the measurement of face recogni-
tion ability involved the George Washington Social Intelligence
Test (GWSIT), developed in the late 1920s (Hunt, 1928). The
GWSIT consisted of six subtests, two of which involved faces. A
face recognition subtest assessed the ability to learn the names
for a set of twelve novel target faces; then, presented with a
larger group of faces, one was required to pick out the target
faces and recall their names. The second subtest involving faces
assessed the ability to label the mental states of faces based on
their expression. The remaining four subtests verbally assessed
other aspects of social knowledge and social judgment (Hunt,
1928).
TheinitialvalidationstudyfortheGWSITclearlyshowedthat,
though none of its subtests correlated particularly highly with
each other (maximum r = 0.44), the face recognition subtest
dissociated most strongly of all from the other subtests (mean
r = 0.22; Hunt, 1928). On the basis of these dissociations, as
well as a dissociation from a measure of general intelligence,
Hunt (1928) presciently suggested that “the special ability of
being able to recognize [faces] is relatively independent of pure
‘brains”’.
What happened next is telling. Surprisingly, at least in hind-
sight, the promising evidence that the GWSIT provided for face
recognition’s speciﬁcity was not eagerly pursued. Quite to the
contrary, the GWSIT was roundly criticized for failing to measure
a unitary social ability. That is, it was criticized (a) because its
subtests dissociated strongly from each other; and (b) because
the small amount of overlap between its subtests was ultimately
attributed to general intelligence (Thorndike, 1936; Thorndike
andStein,1937).Onthisbasis,theGWSITrapidlyfelloutoffavor
asaresearchinstrument(KihlstromandCantor,2000).Moreover,
a mere two decades after it was introduced, the GWSIT was cited,
in what would soon become the classic paper on test validity, as
the classic example of an invalid test (Campbell and Fiske, 1959).
In sum, far from inspiring further research, face recognition’s
clear and persistent dissociations from other abilities were the
core inspiration for the rejection of the GWSIT as a valid ability
measure.
Lest one be tempted to write off the rejection of the GWSIT
as an isolated historical event, let us move forward nearly 70
years to a second, remarkably similar story. This story involved
the third edition of the highly inﬂuential Wechsler Memory Scale
(WMS-III), introduced in 1997 (Wechsler, 1997). The WMS-III
added, for the ﬁrst time in the WMS’s history, a face recognition
subtest. This subtest assessed the ability to memorize a set of
faces and then classify a subsequent series of faces as “old” (seen
before) vs. “new” (not seen before) (Wechsler, 1997). As with
the GWSIT, the WMS-III’s face recognition subtest dissociated
persistently from other measures. These other measures included
the WMS’s own verbal and visual recognition subtests (Wechsler,
1997; Millis et al., 1999; Holdnack and Delis, 2004). Again, such
dissociations were viewed as a liability rather than a virtue. The
face recognition subtest was criticized for its dissociations (Millis
et al., 1999; Holdnack and Delis, 2004), and it was dropped from
the WMS-IV (Wechsler, 2009).
Seven decades apart, the story was the same. Face recognition’s
dissociations fueled a presumption of invalid measurement and
an abandonment of measures, with remarkably little work aimed
at disentangling speciﬁcity from invalid measurement by examin-
ingcorrelationsacrossdiversemeasuresoffacerecognitionability.
The persistence with which face recognition was overlooked in
these cases illustrates a blind spot for speciﬁcity that we believe
is broadly characteristic of traditional test development practices
in the human ability literature.
FACE RECOGNITION AS A MODEL IN THE SEARCH FOR
FURTHER SPECIFIC ABILITIES
We will now discuss three key factors that fueled the recent dis-
covery that face recognition varies speciﬁcally across individuals,
and that could plausibly fuel the discovery of further speciﬁcally
varying abilities. These factors were: incorporation of priorities,
discoveries, and techniques from experimental psychology and
cognitive neuroscience; the development and validation of an
excellent test; and a powerful internet-enabled Citizen Science
approach to investigating human variation.
In contrast to the human ability literature’s capacity to over-
look dissociations, the cognitive neuroscience and experimental
psychology literatures have, throughout their history, actively
sought out dissociations. A remarkable aspect of the WMS story
is that its face recognition subtest was introduced the same
year, 1997, as major reports of face-selective activation in the
human fusiform face area (FFA; see also Sergent et al., 1992;
Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997). Simultaneously,
the WMS’s dissociations inspired disappointment and rejection,
while the FFA’s dissociations inspired excitement and follow-
up work. Indeed, the FFA’s dissociations, along with other key
neural and cognitive dissociations, have played a central role
in solidifying the status of face processing as a major model
system in studies of mind and brain. Such different reactions to
evidence for dissociation are instructive when considering where
to look for speciﬁc abilities. Perhaps equally valuable inspiration
on where to look could be derived from the orphan tests of
human abilities research (tests that were reliable yet abandoned
due to their persistent dissociations) and the core dissociable
model systems of cognitive neuroscience and experimental psy-
chology.
As illustrative examples of ability domains that could plau-
sibly contain additional speciﬁc abilities, consider social cog-
nition, navigation, and dynamic visual perception. In the case
of social cognition, the dissociations produced by the GWSIT
raise the possibility that additional speciﬁc social abilities may
exist (Hunt, 1928; Kihlstrom and Cantor, 2000; see also Mayer
et al., 2008), and several aspects of social cognition, including
theory of mind and joint attention, have been associated with
distinct neural areas (Saxe, 2006). Navigation and dynamic visual
perception, too, each involve well-deﬁned neural areas (Epstein
and Kanwisher, 1998; Newsome and Pare, 1988), and appear to
dissociatefromatleastsomegeneralabilities(Hegartyetal.,2006;
Wilmer and Nakayama, 2007). These are merely a few illustrative
examples of the many domains in which orphan tests and/or
functional or neural dissociations exist. We expect that there
exist tens or hundreds of additional areas were such evidence
is compelling enough to consider initiating a search for speciﬁc
abilities.
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The recent discovery of face recognition’s speciﬁcity owes
much to the careful development of a single, high-quality test:
the CFMT (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006). Ironically, it was the
cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology literatures,
not the human abilities literature, that inspired the development
of the CFMT (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006). The CFMT’s
development drew primarily from three scientiﬁc areas. First,
it drew from the stimulus-control techniques of visual psy-
chophysics to produce well-controlled stimuli. Second, it drew
from the dissociation-focused manipulations of cognitive neu-
roscience and experimental psychology to achieve an effective
isolation of face processing mechanisms. Third, it drew from
the practical test design methods of patient-based neuropsycho-
logical testing to minimize its demands on test-takers’ general
cognitive resources, including their capacity to attend, interpret,
and problem-solve (taxing such general resources likely increases
a test’s reliance on general intellectual ability) (Duchaine and
Nakayama, 2006).
The exceptional speciﬁcity of face recognition, as measured by
the CFMT, is a case study in the value of incorporating the pri-
orities, discoveries, and techniques of cognitive neuroscience and
experimental psychology into efforts to measure human ability.
Meaningful progress in the isolation of speciﬁc abilities, however,
additionally requires a combination of rigorous psychometrics
and access to the large, diverse samples of participants that enable
iterative development, validation, and norming of high-quality
tests.
Fortunately, we live at a time when the internet has opened up
unprecedented opportunities for testing large samples. Resources
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk®–an online clearing-house
for small jobs where psychological research is increasingly
conducted—enable the rapid recruitment and testing of large
samples. Our own web-based work on face recognition and other
abilities has been powered by our Citizen Science project TestMy-
Brain.org (Germine et al., 2012). As with other citizen science
initiatives (Bonney et al., 2009), TestMyBrain.org seeks to actively
collaborate with the general public to answer scientiﬁc questions.
At TestMyBrain.org, we make high-quality tests freely available
via the web, and participants complete these tests to learn about
themselves. We then aggregate data across participants to further
reﬁne the tests we offer and to answer scientiﬁc questions. Due
to high public interest in self-discovery, the ease of participation
across demographic groups, and the near-zero incremental cost
of recruiting and testing each additional participant, our studies
of face recognition have been able to rapidly collect high-quality
data from many thousands of individuals of varied age, sex,
occupation, and socioeconomic status (Wilmer et al., 2010, 2012;
Germine et al., 2011a,b, 2012). Citizen science projects like Test-
MyBrain.org, as well as other large-scale internet-based testing
projects like Mechanical Turk, provide the necessary throughput
to capture speciﬁc abilities and examine their importance in our
lives.
CONCLUSIONS
Here, we have examined face recognition as a model speciﬁc
ability. First, we reviewed the recent work that documents face
recognition’s speciﬁcity. Second, we recounted two major false
starts in the measurement of face recognition ability. These false
starts reveal a capacity for speciﬁc abilities not only to be missed,
but indeed, to be actively avoided by major test development
efforts. Third, we discussed three key factors that contributed
to the discovery that face recognition ability is speciﬁc and that,
we believe, could serve as a compass for the discovery of further
speciﬁc abilities. These factors were: incorporation of priorities,
discoveries, and techniques from experimental psychology and
cognitive neuroscience; the development and validation of an
excellent test; and a powerful internet-enabled Citizen Science
approach to investigating human variation. We suggest that the
time is right for a renewed effort to investigate speciﬁc abilities,
and that this effort can be guided by the model example of face
recognition ability. By revealing relatively independent dimen-
sions of human ability, such work would enhance our capacity
to understand the uniqueness of individual minds.
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